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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In early 1994 the Canadian government charged two Chicago police
officers, Anthony Lobue and Thomas Kulekowskis, with kidnapping for their
participation in a friend's attempt to retrieve his physically and mentally
disabled wife, Tammy, from her parents' home in Winnipeg, Canada.'
Canadian authorities, alerted of the kidnapping by Tammy's parents, were
able to thwart the conspiracy at the border.2
The two Chicago police officers were returned to the United States but
had to submit to extradition proceedings pursuant to the United States-
Canada extradition treaty.3 The Canadian government executed the first step
of the extradition process by requesting surrender of the two men for
prosecution of the kidnapping charge. Following a United States federal
magistrate's certification of extraditability and the Secretary of State's
issuance of surrender warrants, Lobue and Kulekowskis brought an action in
the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking an injunction and
declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the United States
extradition statute.4
What makes this particular case important are not the facts leading up to
the extradition request but the district court's ruling that the United States
extradition statute,5 on which all foreign extradition treaties are based, was
* J.D. 1997.
Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 67 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated on other grounds,
82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
2 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 67.
3 Treaty with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, U.S.-U.K., 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849
(applicable to Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196 (1994).
4 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 67.
' 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994). The statute originated in the Act of August 12, 1848, 9 Stat.
302. It was continued as Rev. Stat. § 5270 and was codified in substantially its present form
in 1948, 62 Stat. 822. See Kin-Hong v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mass. 1996).
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unconstitutional. The extradition statute was deemed violative of separation
of powers doctrine and thus unconstitutional because it purportedly gives the
Secretary of State authority to review legal findings of extradition judges.6
In light of the Lobue holding, several fugitives have attempted to emulate
Lobue's strategy and argue that the extradition statute is violative of
separation of powers doctrine. However, this argument has not been
successful in any other federal district court. This comment examines the
foreign policy and governmental implications of the district court's holding.
In particular, this comment will analyze the subsequent extradition proceed-
ings that have blatantly rejected the Lobue v. Christopher holding.7 The
comment concludes that the manner in which the judiciary and the executive
share responsibility in the extradition process is constitutional and that Lobue
is probably a mere aberration in the 148 year history of the extradition
statute.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Extradition Procedure
Extradition is the formal surrender of a person by one nation to another
for prosecution or punishment.8  In the United States, extradition is
considered a national act exclusively controlled by the federal government
under its constitutional power9 to conduct foreign relations and make
treaties.'" Under this constitutional power, Congress enacted an extradition
6 Lobue, 893 F. Supp at 67.
7 For courts that have considered the question since Lobue and have held to the contrary,
see In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1995); In re Lin, 915 F. Supp. 206 (D.Guam
1995); In re Sutton, 905 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Cherry v. Warden, Metro.
Correctional Ctr., No. 95 Cr.Mis.1 p.7(LB), 1995 WL 598986 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Carreno v.
Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1995); In re Sidali, 899 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.J. 1995);
In re Marzook, 924 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100
(2d Cir. 1996). The author finds the reasoning of these courts more persuasive.
8 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 21 (1935).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
10 1 JOHN B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDMON §§ 44-
69 (1891). This rationale is premised on two grounds: First, extradition is a treaty-founded
process and a matter of foreign affairs within the enumerated powers of the Federal
Government and vested in the President. Second, treaties are ratified by means of the "advice
and consent" of the Senate. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 29-30 (1974).
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statute whereby the Secretary of State will only surrender a fugitive when a
treaty exists between the United States and the demanding country" and a
reviewing court has certified that sufficient evidence exists to extradite. 2
The process and procedure for extraditing a fugitive from the United
States to a foreign country where he has been charged with committing a
crime is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3184."3 Under this statutory scheme, a
federal extradition judge conducts a hearing, receives evidence, and issues
a legal determination concerning the extraditability of the fugitive. 4 In
order to certify the fugitive as extraditable, the United States government
must establish the following jurisdictional and legal elements: (1) the
offense charged is extraditable under the applicable treaty; 5 (2) the offense
satisfies the "dual criminality"' 6 requirement; (3) there is probable cause to
" 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
12 For a political criticism of the United States extradition process, see Kai I. Rebane,
Extradition & Individual Rights: The Need for an International Criminal Court to Safeguard
Individual Rights, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1636 (1996). Rebane concludes that extradition
procedures are in conflict with international human rights and that only an impartial, extra-
national body should oversee extradition to guarantee that individual rights are honored. Id.
at 1686.
13 The statute provides: Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between
the United States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or
any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court
of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, charging
any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any
such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue
his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such
justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and
considered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under
the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a
copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue
upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender
of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue
his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain
until such surrender shall be made. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
14 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
15 In order to satisfy this requirement, the United States government must show that the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the individual. See In re Lin, 915 F. Supp.
206, 208 (D. Guam 1995).
16 The conduct alleged must be unlawful in both the United States and the requesting
country. See Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson 858 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
no offense is extraditable unless it describes conduct which is criminal in both jurisdictions),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106.
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believe that the accused committed the crime for which he is sought; 7 and
(4) the accused has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence a valid
defense to the extradition. 8 If the judge determines that any of these four
requirements is not satisfied, the accused is released. If, on the other hand,
the judge concludes that each of these criteria have been met, the accused is
certified as extraditable and a copy of the court testimony is turned over to
the Secretary of State.' 9
B. Lobue v. Christopher
Ever since the enactment of the Constitution in 1787, there has been
considerable controversy concerning if and when the three branches of the
United States government can interact. In what is commonly referred to as
the separation of powers debate, the executive, judicial, and legislative
branches have been in constant conflict over the boundaries of their
respective power. Lobue v. Christopher resurrected this age-old separation
of powers debate by holding that the United States extradition statute imbues
the Secretary of State with the authority to review the legal findings of
extradition judges. 2° The court reasoned that the Secretary of State has
discretion under domestic law to deny extradition even after a United States
court has certified that the accused may be extradited under the terms of an
applicable treaty or agreement. In finding that the statute and the authority
it confers to the Secretary of State was unconstitutional, the Lobue court
applied a rigid and formalistic view of separation of powers doctrine which
led to the conclusion that the executive branch was interfering in the judicial
domain. The court grounded its conclusion in a three prong analysis
consisting of a textual examination of the statute, the consistent statutory
interpretation by the three branches of government, and the historical practice
of implementing the statute.
"7 E.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932
(1978).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994); see also, Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 364
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), afftd, 925 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1991); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1367
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978).
19 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
20 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 71.
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1. Executive Review of Judicial Determinations
The extradition statute provides that if the extradition judge "deems the
evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper
treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all
testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State.",2' The Lobue court
concluded that there was no plausible explanation why Congress would
require the extradition judge to certify the evidence and turn over a copy of
the testimony other than to permit the Secretary of State to perform his own
independent review of the legality of the extradition.22
The Lobue court's historical support for this textual interpretation was an
opinion by the Solicitor General written in 1881 when the statute was
enacted.23 The Lobue court further stated that this "double protection,"
allowing the Secretary to review the extradition judge's determination, might
be desirable in the extradition scheme, but it may not be achieved in a
manner which violates the Constitution.U
According to the court, all three branches of government have consistently
taken the position that the Secretary's review of extradition proceedings
extends to the legal conclusions of the extradition judge.2 The Lobue court
further relied on Ornelas v. Ruiz for the proposition that the extradition judge
"is to certify his findings on the testimony to the Secretary of State that the
case may be reviewed by the executive department of the government. 26
Finally, in the third prong of its analysis, the Lobue court reasoned that
historical evidence revealed a past practice by Secretaries of State of
21 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1985).
22 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 68.
23 The Solicitor General's interpretation of the statute at the request of the Secretary was
unambiguous. He stated, "I am of the opinion that the proceedings below come before you
upon a quasi certiorari, and that your discretion extends to a review of every question therein
presented." See Lobue, 893 F. Supp at 68-69 (citing 17 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 184, 185
(1881)).
24 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 69 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
2' The Executive has the power of reviewing all the proceedings and passing judgment
on their correctness. Furthermore, the Judiciary can neither order the delivery of the
requested person nor bind the action of the President. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 82, 47th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1882).
26 Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 508 (1896). See also 3 Dep't State Legal Advisor Op.
2356, 2367 (1931) ("The Secretary of State may review the evidence and reach an entirely
different conclusion.").
1996]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
reviewing and setting aside the legal conclusions of extradition judges.27
The Lobue court relied primarily on In re Stupp,28 the first case to recog-
nize executive discretion over judicial determinations of extradition.29 In
that case, the extradition judge certified that the accused was extraditable to
the Secretary of State.3 However, the Secretary of State, in his review,
sought assistance from the Attorney General who found that the accused was
not legally extraditable. Following the Attorney General's conclusion, the
Secretary refused to issue a warrant of surrender.3 On the basis of In re
Stupp, the Lobue court concluded that there was "overwhelming evidence
that the Secretary of State does in fact subject the legal determinations of
extradition judges to executive branch review. ' 32  The Lobue court's
conclusion that the extradition statute did indeed authorize executive revision
was tantamount to its finding of unconstitutionality.
2. Finding of Unconstitutionality
The constitutional issue in Lobue arises from the fact that the judicial
officer must turn over a copy of the testimony to the Secretary of State. The
court concluded that by requiring testimony to be turned over to the
executive, the extradition statute forces the judiciary to issue non-final, non-
binding "advisory opinions which are subject to review and revision by the
27 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 70.
2' In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 301 (No. 13563) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875).
29 See Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313, 1328 (1962)
(detailing the infrequent use of executive extradition review, but concluding that the role of
the Secretary of State "is really one of conducting a de novo examination of the case to
determine whether the requirements of the treaty have been met").
30 23 F. Cas. at 301. The court held that the accused was not extraditable to Prussia in
light of the fact that the conduct with which he was charged occurred in Belgium, while the
United States-Prussia extradition treaty permitted extradition only for crimes committed within
the jurisdiction of the requesting country.
31 Id.
32 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 70. Although the Lobue court concluded that the Executive
Branch does have this power to review extradition proceedings, it has been rarely exercised.
See 4 MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JuDIcIAL ASSISTANCE 260
(1990) ("On only two occasions since 1950 has the Secretary declined to issue a warrant for
the surrender of a person found extraditable.").
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executive branch. 33 As a result, the statute was declared unconstitutional
because Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in
officials of the executive branch.3
3. Procedural Posture
On September 15, 1995, following the resolution of the case, the district
court issued an order certifying as a class "all persons who presently are or
in the future will be under threat of extradition from the United States. 35
The order enjoined the Secretary of State, the State Department, and the
United States from surrendering any member of the plaintiff class. 36  It
further stayed extradition of all class members.37 However, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a partial stay of the
district court's order pending appeal. The stay allowed extradition of any
class members other than the two named plaintiffs and a third individual who
intervened.38
In April 1996 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard the appeal and
vacated the District Court's judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
to issue declaratory relief.39  The District Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because Lobue and Kulekowskis, who were under constructive
custody of the United States marshall for the Northern District of Illinois,
could challenge the extradition statute through a petition for habeas corpus
in Illinois. Since the plaintiffs had an available habeas remedy in Illinois,
33 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 70-71. The government advanced several arguments in
opposition, but they were all summarily rejected. These arguments will be revisited in the
Legal Analysis section of this comment.
3 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 71 (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1453
(1995)).
3 Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp., modified to grant class certification, Civil Action
No. 95-1097 (Sept. 15, 1995). The order expressly provides that the injunction does not
extend to extradition proceedings, only to surrender of a member of the plaintiff class.
3 Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, modified to grant class certification, Civil
Action No. 95-1097 (RCL), P(3).
37 id.
3' Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, stay of class lifted, No. 95-5293 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 29, 1995).
39 Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, vacated on other grounds, 82 F.3d 1081, 1084
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (determining that Congress intended to displace more general remedies by
promulgating the more specific habeas statute; rejecting conception that a fugitive contesting
his imprisonment could pursue redress in the nature of mandamus or declaratory judgment).
1996]
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they could not bring an action for declaratory judgment in another district.4°
The D.C. Circuit did not address the issue of the constitutionality of the
extradition statute, thus it seems that the reasoning of the District Court
concerning the extradition statute still remains good law.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Prior to Lobue v. Christopher, the constitutionality of the extradition
statute had never been challenged on separation of powers grounds."'
Setting legal precedent, the district court interpreted historical practice to find
the extradition statute unconstitutional. If later courts adopt the Lobue v.
Christopher court's reasoning, the extradition procedure, premised for almost
150 years on 18 U.S.C. § 3184, will have to be reexamined and reformulat-
ed. The implications of this possible reformulation are profound in that
every treaty between the United States and a foreign country concerning
extradition is based on 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Treaties will have to be rewritten
with another statutory basis. Furthermore, hundreds of extradition proceed-
ings take place each year, and the fugitives in these cases will either have to
be set free or remain jailed pending resolution of the constitutionality of the
statute. However, when one looks at the United States government's
arguments in extradition cases following Lobue v. Christopher, it seems
probable that the court's "rigid and formalistic application of separation of
powers principles ' 42 will not be adopted by later courts.
o The fugitive must pursue whatever habeas corpus relief he seeks against his actual
custodian in the district of his confinement. Lobue, 82 F.3d at 1084 (citing Topazov v. U.S.
I.N.S., 929 F. Supp. 479 (D.D.C. 1996); Chatman-Bey v. Thomburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 813
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
41 With regard td the failure of the courts to raise the issue on its own initiative, the
Lobue court stated, "It is certainly unfortunate that this fundamental flaw has gone unnoticed
for so long; however, the court will not further compound this error by turning a blind eye
to the statute now." Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 78. However, several post-Lobue extradition
proceedings took a less activist approach and recognized "a well established principle of
statutory construction requires that courts, whenever possible, interpret statutes in a manner
that avoids constitutional difficulties." See Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624, 629 (S.D.
Fla. 1995); In re Sutton, 898 F. Supp. 631, 635 (E.D. Mo. 1995). Given the extensive body
of extradition case law, it is highly improbable that all of these courts could have overlooked
the constitutional infirmity found by the court in Lobue.
42 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 76.
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A. The Lobue Court Failed to Address the Threshold Issue of Whether the
Plaintiffs in the Case Actually Had Standing to Challenge the Extradition
Statute
In the absence of a plaintiff with standing, a federal court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the case.43 Standing consists of three elements:
(1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) redressability." In Extradition of Lang, the
district court concluded that although a plaintiff who is the subject of
government action typically has standing, the plaintiffs challenging the
extradition statute did not.45 This conclusion was based on the fact that the
alleged illegality in the extradition process, executive revision, causes no
injury in fact.' In addition, the court determined that the review by the
Secretary of State works only to the benefit of the plaintiffs, never to their
harm.47 It only serves as a second chance for them to be deemed not
extraditable, and any potential unconstitutionality occurs only after the
plaintiff has been found legally extraditable.48 Although the court in
Extradition of Lang found that the plaintiffs did not have standing, a foreign
government seeking extradition of a person would have standing in federal
court to challenge the extradition statute's constitutionality.49 Based on the
fact that a foreign government could challenge the constitutionality of the
extradition statute, a further analysis of the United States government's
arguments advanced in post-Lobue extradition hearings must be undertaken.
43 See In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
"See In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. at 1391 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992)).
"' See In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. at 1391.
4 See id.
"4 If the judicial officer refuses to certify the detainee as extraditable, the Secretary of
State cannot reverse that decision. Thus, the executive revision can only work to the
plaintiff's benefit. See In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. at 1392, citing Eain v. Wilkes, 614 F.2d 504,
508 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
" See In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. at 1392. One commentator has suggested that in
extradition, the executive exercises "benign discretion," discretion that benefits the losing
party at the expense of the government. This discretion raises no separation of powers
concerns because it does not threaten judicial independence nor does it interfere with the
ability of the judiciary to vindicate the rights of successful litigants. Note, Executive Revision
of Judicial Decisions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2020 passim (1996).
49 See In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. at 1400.
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B. The Extradition Statute Is Comparable to Other Law Enforcement
Procedures
In determining that the extradition statute was unconstitutional, the Lobue
court concluded that extradition judges' findings were simply non-binding,
non-final advisory opinions subject to review by the Secretary of State.5"
Because courts are not allowed to issue advisory opinions for review by
other branches of government, the court found the statute unconstitutional.
The court rejected the government's argument that Congress patterned the
extradition procedure on other law enforcement processes, such as the
decision to arrest, search, or prosecute in criminal cases, in which executive
branch discretionary decisions follow judicial determinations of legality.5
Although the Lobue court rejected this argument, subsequent courts have
found the analogy of an extradition to both a search warrant procedure or a
preliminary hearing to be compelling.52
In Extradition of Lin, the district court concluded that the divisions of
functions between the judicial and executive branches under 18 U.S.C. §
3184 were similar to several well established criminal procedures. 5' The
court found most persuasive the comparison to the separate, but interconnect-
ed roles of the judiciary and the executive in the initial stages of a criminal
prosecution based on a criminal complaint.54 In the criminal prosecution
context, once the judge determines that there is probable cause to detain a
defendant, the prosecutor applies his discretion whether to continue or halt
the proceedings.55 Moreover, in the criminal setting, the division of
functions between the judge and the prosecutor is not a violation of
constitutional separation of powers. In Extradition of Lin, the court reasoned
" Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 71.
5' Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 75.
52 See, e.g., In re Lin, 915 F. Supp. 206, 212 (D.Guam 1995); In re Sutton, 905 F. Supp.
631, 634 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Cherry v. Warden, Metro. Correctional Ctr., No. 95 Cr.Misc.1
P.7(LB), 1995 WL 598986 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
51 915 F. Supp. at 212.
4 Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 ("If from the evidence it appears that there is
probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
committed it, the federal magistrate judge shall forthwith hold the defendant to answer in
district court."); In re Sutton, 905 F. Supp. at 634 (citing several courts that have concluded
that the extradition hearing is similar to the determination of whether there is probable cause
to hold a defendant for trial).
- In re Lin, 915 F. Supp. at 212.
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that each step of extradition is a separate exercise of the judicial and
executive branch's governmental responsibility. 6 The court then analogiz-
ed the Secretary's review of a judge's determination of extraditability to the
prosecutor's review of a judge's determination of the existence of probable
cause, concluding that "just as the two branches can have separate but related
roles in the context of law enforcement, they may be permitted to execute
similar roles in matters of extradition. 57
The Lobue court rejected this analogy because in the criminal prosecution
context, the judiciary has several opportunities to determine whether the
arrest or search warrant was supported by probable cause, but in the
extradition context the judge's decision is the final word of the judiciary on
the question of extraditability.58 However, the court failed to take into
account that once a defendant is certified as extraditable he will be given a
fair criminal trial in the country to which he is extradited. Therefore,
contrary to the court's reasoning, the extradition hearing will not be the final
judicial avenue for the defendant since he will have several opportunities to
prove his innocence in the country of his origin.
C. The Extradition Statute Does Not Convey an Affirmative Grant of Power
to the Secretary of State to Review and Set Aside the Extradition Judge's
Legal Determination
The extradition statute provides that, if the judicial officer, "deems the
evidence sufficient to sustain a charge under the provisions of the proper
treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the
testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may
issue .... ,59 The Lobue court concluded that "there is simply no plausible
explanation for why Congress would require the extradition judge to certify
6 Id.
57 Id. See also Cherry v. Warden, Metro. Correctional Ctr., No. 95 Cr.Misc.1 P.7(LB),
1995 WL 598986 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the extradition hearing is analogous to
a judge issuing a search warrant upon a finding of probable cause). The argument goes as
follows: in the criminal prosecution context Article Three is not offended when the executive
branch declines to prosecute after a magistrate has determined that there is sufficient evidence
to justify the holding of the accused. Therefore, the fact that the testimony from extradition
hearings is reviewed by a member of the executive branch is not violative of separation of
powers doctrine.
58 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 74.
59 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
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the evidence ... other than to permit the Secretary to perform his own
independent review of the legality of the extradition. ' 60 As a result, the
court determined that the statute provided an affirmative grant of power to
the Secretary of State to review the extradition judge's findings.
Other courts interpreting the text of the statute have concluded that these
words do not convey an affirmative grant of power to review the extradition
judge's findings; instead, they have found the language to prescribe the
method by which the judicial officer shall convey a finding of extraditability
to the Secretary of State.6' Furthermore, courts have held that the compila-
tion of a complete record is not simply for the Secretary to perform his own
"independent review of the legality of the extradition," 62 but is instead for
the purpose of forwarding such a record to the requesting country.63 In
light of the need to forward a judicial record to the requesting country and
the intricacies involved when the judiciary and executive branches are
required to function in unison, the Lobue court's conclusion that the
extradition statute provides an affirmative grant of power to the Secretary of
State to review judges' findings of extraditability is unfounded.'
D. Extradition Is Primarily a Function of the Executive Branch and Not
a Function of the Judicial Branch
The basis of the Lobue court's holding that the extradition statute was
violative of separation of powers principles was the belief that extradition
proceedings were a matter for the judiciary, and the Secretary of State's
review of the proceedings was an impermissible intrusion into judicial
o Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 68.
61 The key word in the statute is "may." "May" merely provides for a permissive grant
of power, not an affirmative one. See, e.g., Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624, 630 (S.D.
Fla. 1995) (holding that although the Secretary "may" issue a surrender warrant it is not an
affirmative grant of power to review extradition judge's findings). See also In re Sutton, 905
F. Supp. 631, 635 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (concurring with the conclusion reached by the court in
Carreno).
62 Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 68.
63 See Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624 at 630 (S.D. Fla. 1995); In re Sutton, 898
F. Supp. 631 at 635 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
6 See In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("Actually, it is
possible that the Secretary of State would want as much information as possible concerning
the circumstances of the crime and of the extradition so as to exercise his or her discretionary
judgment whether to extradite."); Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624, 630 (S.D. Fla. 1995);
In re Sutton, 898 F. Supp. 631, 635 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
[Vol. 26:247
LOBUE V. CHRISTOPHER
domain. However, when looking to the United States Constitution,
Congressional direction, and extradition case law, it seems as if the Lobue
court misunderstood the constitutional allocation of authority over extradition
determinations.65
The United States Constitution gives the President the power to make
treaties with the "advice and consent" of the Senate.' Although the
Constitution gives the judiciary the power to hear cases involving treaties
made under the authority of the federal government,67 Congress enacted a
statute giving the judiciary only a limited review function in extradition
cases. 6' Historically, once the judge has certified his findings, the Secretary
of State has conducted an independent review of the case to determine
whether to issue a warrant of surrender to the requesting nation.69 Through
the textual language of the Constitution and the limitations placed on the
judiciary by Congress, the executive remains the controlling branch in the
extradition process.
Another example of the limited function of the judiciary is illustrated
in Cherry v. Warden, which held that an extradition judge is only deciding
whether extradition would be lawful and is not making a final determination
that extradition should or should not be carried out.70 The Cherry court
reasoned that the judiciary should make legal determinations and foreign
policy political determinations should be within the discretion of the
Secretary of State.7 '
In addition, the ultimate decision to surrender the individual falls within
the purview of the executive branch as part of the executive's power to
6 Extradition determinations which are made pursuant to treaties are constitutionally
committed to the executive branch not the judicial branch. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
For a provocative argument along the foregoing lines, see Judith Hippler Bello & Jacques
Semmelman, Extradition Statute-Constitutional Law-Separation of Powers-Injunction
Against U.S. Government-Class Action, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (1996). See also In re
Marzook, 924 F. Supp. 565, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that there is no impermissible
aggrandizement of power by either the Executive or Judicial Branch because extradition is
an Executive Branch function not an Article HI function of the judiciary).
66 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
67 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 69-70.
70 Cherry v. Warden, Metro. Correctional Ctr., No. 95 Cr.Misc.1 P.7(LB), 1995 WL
598986 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that extradition may involve foreign policy
considerations and review by the executive branch of an extradition judge's decision does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine).
71 Id.
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conduct foreign affairs and consider factors that may affect foreign policy
and relations.72 The foreign policy concerns for allowing extradition
proceedings to be a function of the executive branch and not the judicial
branch are threefold.73 First and foremost, the Secretary of State, unlike the
courts, is in the best position to engage in the discreet diplomatic maneuver-
ing the extradition process may require.74 Second, the Secretary of State
controls the circumstances of surrender of the detainee to the foreign
country.75 Third, a judicial decision not to extradite based on humanitarian
grounds may adversely affect important foreign policy concerns.76 Thus,
the underlying premise in Lobue, that the judiciary has priority in extradition
proceedings, is unjustified in light of Constitutional safeguards, Congressio-
nal direction, and case law.
E. The Extradition Statute Is a Constitutional Combination of the Powers
of the Executive and Judicial Branches and Not a Violation of Separation
of Powers Principles
The Lobue court's conclusion that the extradition statute is unconstitutional
as violative of separation of powers doctrine is dubious. Taking into account
the fact that the process by which extradition takes place involves indepen-
dent determinations by both the judicial and executive branches, this "dual
branch procedure is pragmatically designed to deal with a federal issue that
directly confronts both legal and foreign policy considerations. 77
Furthermore, the merger of activities between the judiciary and executive in
72 See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-322
(1936); Cherry v. Warden, Metro. Correctional Ctr., No. 95 Cr.Mis.1 p.7(LB), 1995 WL
598986 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
73 Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-inquiry in
International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198, 1229 (1991).
7" United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("The nature
of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their
success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch." (citing 8 U.S. Sen. Rep. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, p. 24 (1816)).
7- See In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 137 (D.N.J. 1987).
76 See In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 136-37 (D.N.J. 1987) ("Any judicial determination
might embarrass the United States in its foreign relations and do harm to those relations.").
See also Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The degree of risk to
[defendant's] life from extradition is an issue that properly falls within the exclusive purview
of the executive branch."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
" See In re Lin, 915 F. Supp. 206, 212 (D. Guam 1995).
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the extradition process involves exactly "the integration of dispersed powers
into a workable government contemplated by Madison and our founding
fathers. ' 8  The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed two central
Madisonian principles of separation of power: (1) the separation of
government power is essential to the preservation of democracy and our
federal system of government; and (2) separation of powers is not defined
by an absolute or clear line of demarcation. 79 The Lobue court's "rigid and
formalistic""W view of separation of powers is contrary to the framers' intent
and Supreme Court precedent. The framers were aware of the need for
separation of powers, but they also realized the essential and pragmatic need
for cooperation and interdependence among the three branches of govern-
ment. In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the rigid and
formalistic view of separation of powers advanced by the Lobue court would
cause the government to cease to operate efficiently."1 As Justice Holmes
so adequately stated, "We must remember that the machinery of government
would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints."82 The
Lobue holding does not allow for any play in those joints.
IV. CONCLUSION
The extradition process is a complex problem encompassing many
democratic and foreign policy concerns. Congress has implemented these
concerns into the design of the extradition statute by allowing both the
judiciary and the executive the opportunity to participate in the proceedings.
The "rigid and formalistic" view of separation of powers advanced by the
district court in Lobue v. Christopher does not allow the extradition process
to achieve the pragmatic results it so desperately demands. By allowing both
the judiciary and the executive to flexibly apply their own expertise, the
extradition statute allows for both a workable and constitutional answer to
the intricacies of extradition. In light of the government's arguments
advanced in subsequent cases after Lobue, it is likely that Lobue will remain
an aberration in the 148 year history of the extradition statute, and that
courts will continue to uphold the statute's constitutionality.
78 See id. at 213.
79 See id. at 212. See generally THE FEDERALIST, No. 47 (James Madison).
o Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 76.
SI The view that separation of the three branches of the federal government must be
complete has been rejected as too rigid and outdated. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
356, 380 (1981); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
82 See Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931).
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